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Abstract 
While many theoretical arguments against or in favor 
of open source and closed source software 
development have been presented, the empirical basis 
for the assessment of arguments and the development 
of models is still weak. Addressing this research gap, 
this paper presents the first comprehensive empirical 
investigation of published vulnerabilities and patches 
of 17 widely deployed open source and closed source 
software packages, including operating systems, 
database systems, web browsers, email clients, and 
office systems. The empirical analysis uses 
comprehensive vulnerability data contained in the 
NIST National Vulnerability Database and a newly 
compiled data set of vulnerability patches. The results 
suggest that it is not the particular software 
development style that determines the severity of 
vulnerabilities and vendors’ patching behavior, but 
rather the specific application type and the policy of 
the particular development community, respectively.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
During the past few decades we have got used to 
acquiring software by procuring licenses for a 
proprietary, or binary-only, immaterial object. We have 
come to regard software as a good we have to pay for 
just as we would pay for material objects. However, in 
more recent years, this widely cultivated habit has 
begun to be accompanied by a software model, which 
is characterized by software that comes with a 
compilable source code. This source code is often free 
of charge and may be even modified or redistributed. 
The software type is referred to by the term “open 
source software” (OSS).  
The application fields of OSS are manifold. Internet 
programs, such as the mail transfer agent Sendmail, the 
Web server Apache, the operating system Linux, the 
database system MySQL, and the office package 
OpenOffice are some of the most popular examples. 
Beyond these application types, we also find computer 
games (http://osswin.sourceforge.net/games.html) and 
even business applications, such as AvErp, which is a 
German stock inventory system for small- and 
medium-sized businesses (http://www.synerpy.de/), or 
an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system that is 
being built by a group of U.S. universities and that is 
being overseen by the Kuali Foundation 
(http://kuali.org/). OSS has even become part of the 
core infrastructure of sophisticated technology 
companies, such as Amazon, Google, and Yahoo [1]. 
Obviously, OSS has arrived in the world of important 
and critical information systems that need security 
protection against attacks. Its increasing availability 
and deployment makes it appealing for hackers and 
others who are interested in exploiting software 
vulnerabilities, which become even more dangerous 
when software is not applied in a closed context, but 
interconnected with other systems and the Internet. 
While there is consensus about the fact that opening 
source code to the public increases the potential 
number of reviewers, its impact on finding security 
flaws is controversially debated. Proponents of OSS 
stress the strength of the resulting review process [2] 
and argue in the sense of Raymond [3] that, “Given 
enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” (p. 19), while 
some opponents follow the argument of Levy [4], who 
remarks “Sure, the source code is available. But is 
anyone reading it?” Viega [5] further doubts the 
superior effectiveness of the open source community 
and argues that (1) most code reviewers do not 
explicitly look for vulnerabilities and (2) those who do, 
are mostly interested in finding those vulnerabilities 
that are easy to detect and that bring them high 
reputation. 
While the security discussion is pervaded with 
“beliefs and guesses”, only few quantitative models 
and some empirical studies [6-16] appear in the 
literature. Most of these empirical studies investigate 
one package or few software packages only, and to the 
best knowledge of the author no prior study has been 
conducted to comprehensively study differences 
between open source and closed source software 
security. The reason why comprehensive empirical 
studies have been neglected is probably due to 
laborious and manual effort required to collectand 
analyze the required datadata. However, empirical 
research is necessary, as it has the potential to provide 
insights in the security of widely deployed information 
systems, to support researchers in developing models 
for security measurement, and to enrich the security 
discussion with the provision of facts. 
Interestingly, past empirical studies focus on the 
number of vulnerabilities and neglect to consider their 
severities and its impact on vendors’ patching 
behavior. However, this perspective is important as a 
single highly severe vulnerability that enables attackers 
to get root access to a system is usually more crucial 
than 10 low severe vulnerabilities that only grant 
reading access to unauthorized users. Addressing this 
lack in research, this study collects comprehensive 
empirical data and analyzes open and closed source 
software with regard to the severity of published 
vulnerabilities and vendors’ behavior in patching these 
vulnerabilities. Thereby, it extends earlier studies 
[14;15] in two ways: it builds up a new data pool of 
patching data, which is not available in publicly 
accessible databases, and it uses these data to 
investigate vendors’ behavior in terms of which 
vulnerabilities have been patched. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
The following section presents the background of open 
source and closed source software and provides an 
introduction into vulnerabilities and patches. Section 3 
explains the research methodology of this study and 
the used data, including the investigated software 
packages, before Section 4 presents the findings of this 
empirical study. Finally, the results are summarized 
and conclusions are presented. 
 
2. Background and related work 
 
2.1. Open and closed source software 
 
Generally, the availability of source code to the 
public is a precondition for software being denoted as 
“open source software”. Beyond this requirement, the 
Open Source Initiative (OSI) has defined a set of 
criteria that software has to comply with [17]. The 
(open source) definition (OSD) includes the permission 
to modify the code and to redistribute it. However, it 
does not govern the software development process in 
terms of who is eligible to modify the original version. 
When what is called “bazaar style” by Raymond [3] is 
in place, any volunteer can provide source code 
submissions. Software development is then often based 
on informal communication between the coders [18]. 
In a more closed environment, software is crafted by 
individual wizards and the development process is 
characterized by a relatively strong control of design 
and implementation. This style is referred to as 
“cathedral style” [3]. As the particular development 
style might have an impact on the security of software, 
a detailed discussion of open source security should 
take this into account.   
Several OSD-compliant licenses have come into 
operation, such as the Apache License, BSD license, 
and GNU General Public License (GPL), which is 
maintained by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). 
The FSF provides a definition of “‘free software’ [as] 
a matter of liberty, not price.” [19] In contrast to the 
OSD definition, the FSF definition explicitly focuses 
on the option of releasing the improvements to the 
public, thereby rejecting a strong supervision of the 
modification process. More specifically, the definition 
says: “If you do publish your changes, you should not 
be required to notify anyone in particular, or in any 
particular way.” Similar to the discussion of what 
open or free software is, we need to define what 
“closed software” is: Software is usually regarded as 
being “closed”, if the source code is not available to 
the public. 
The categorization of software and its development 
process as “open source software (development)” or 
“free software (development)” in contrast to “closed 
source software (development)” reflects the 
perspective of developers and specifies the type of 
development. Complementarily, one could also adopt 
the software user’s point of view by distinguishing 
between software that needs to be paid for and 
software for which no fee applies. The resulting 
classification scheme is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Classification of software [20; p. 2018] 
 
 Open Source 
(license) 
Closed Source 
(source code 
 not available) 
Free of 
charge 
Linux, Apache 
web server 
Adobe Acrobat 
Reader 
Subject to 
charge 
MySQL  
(dual licensing: 
GPL/proprietary 
license for 
Enterprise 
Edition) 
Microsoft 
Windows 
operating 
systems 
 
2.2. Vulnerabilities and patches 
 
When software is executed in a way different from 
what the original software designers intended, this 
misbehavior is rooted in software bugs. Anderson [21] 
assumes the ratio between software bugs and software 
lines of code (SLOC) to be about 1:35, i.e. Windows 
2000 with its 35 Mio. SLOC would have one million 
bugs included. When bugs can be directly used by 
attackers to gain access to a system or network, they 
are termed (information security) “vulnerabilities” by 
MITRE [21]. Although there are other definitions of 
“vulnerabilities” [23;24], the adoption of the MITRE 
definition is useful (in a pragmatic, but not necessarily 
normative sense) for four reasons: 
(1) Most empirical studies implicitly use this 
definition by analyzing “Common Vulnerability and 
Exposures (CVE)” entries, which are based on the 
understanding of MITRE. CVE names are not only 
widely used by researchers, they are also used by 
information security product/service vendors. Thereby, 
the CVE definition has become a “de facto standard”. 
(2) The process of accepting a potential software 
bug as CVE vulnerability is well documented and the 
assessment is conducted by security experts [22]. 
(3) The U.S. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) adopts the MITRE understanding 
of vulnerabilities in their National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD), which is probably the largest 
database of security-critical software bugs and which 
provides comprehensive CVE vulnerability data feeds 
for automated processing. 
(4) The definition is precise 
(http://cve.mitre.org/about/terminology.html): 
A vulnerability is a state in a computing system (or 
set of systems) that either: 
• allows an attacker to execute commands as 
another user 
• allows an attacker to access data that is contrary 
to the specified access restrictions for that data 
• allows an attacker to pose as another entity 
• allows an attacker to conduct a denial of service 
  
It should be noticed that this definition does not 
exactly match the US-CERT vulnerability definition, 
but is “closely related”: “While the mapping between 
CVE names and US-CERT vulnerability IDs are 
usually pretty close, in some cases multiple 
vulnerabilities may map to one CVE name, or vice 
versa. The CVE group tracks a large number of 
security problems, not all of which meet our criteria 
for being considered a vulnerability.”[24] 
Vulnerabilities and their dynamic behavior can be 
described with the “vulnerability life cycle”, which is 
shown in Figure 1 as a UML statechart diagram. The 
diagram provides a process-oriented perspective on a 
single vulnerability and its patch (for the consideration 
of exploits see the study of Frei [8]), integrates states 
that have been introduced by Arbaugh et al. [25], and 
depicts a cycle of vulnerability discovery and repair 
that also creates new vulnerabilities. [24]. The lifecycle 
starts with the injection of a vulnerability into software. 
In principle, a vulnerability can find its way into 
software through (a) the intentional behavior of 
software developers, who strive for selling or 
exploiting vulnerabilities, or for harming the employer, 
or (b) unintentional behavior, which can be rooted in 
careless programming or in using “insecure” 
development tools. This behavior can be economically 
rational as companies often do not have sufficient 
incentives to avoid vulnerabilities [26]. After some 
testing, the software is finally released and the search 
for vulnerabilities begins for the public (and potentially 
continues for the software vendor). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Vulnerability life cycle 
 
The discovery of a vulnerability can be based on 
coincidental detection or on the active search of 
persons with intrinsic motivation (to make software 
more secure) or with extrinsic motivation (to get 
reputation, to gain financial advantage, or “to do their 
job”). When a vulnerability is discovered, the question 
occurs whether it should be published or not. If the 
vulnerability is detected by a “black hat”, his or her 
decision depends on whether s/he aims at making the 
vulnerability available to as many other “black hats” as 
possible and to gain reputation, or to a closed group of 
potential attackers, who can exploit the vulnerability 
exclusively. If the vulnerability is detected by a “white 
hat”, including the software vendor, it is still not clear 
whether the vulnerability should be published or not, as 
vulnerability information is useful for both the good 
guys, who can provide patches, and the bad guys, who 
probably would not have gained knowledge of the 
vulnerability otherwise. Some researchers have 
addressed this question: Rescorla [13] argues against 
disclosure as he finds the probability of vulnerability 
rediscovery being vanishingly small. However, 
investigating the operating system OpenBSD, Ozment 
[16] finds vulnerabilities being correlated regarding 
their rediscovery and argues in favor of disclosure. 
Using game-theoretic models, Arora et al. [27] and 
Nizovtsev and Thursby [28] address the question of 
when software vulnerabilities should be disclosed and 
conclude that neither instant disclosure nor non-
disclosure is optimal. Arora et al. [29] use empirical 
analysis to support their hypothesis, pointing out that 
the optimal policy depends upon how quickly vendors 
provide patches and upon how likely attackers are to 
find and exploit vulnerabilities. Choi et al. [30] discuss 
different disclosure regimes and conclude that 
mandatory disclosure improves welfare only when the 
probability of attack is high and the expected damage 
is small. An overview of the classification of 
vulnerabilities is provided in Figure 2, which also 
shows that in this paper only published vulnerabilities 
are considered, as no reliable data is available for 
unpublished vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Figure 2. Classification of software bugs and 
vulnerabilities, source: [14; p. 2] 
 
Once a vulnerability is published, it seems obvious 
that the vendor should provide a patch as soon as 
possible. But it can be economically reasonable for the 
vendor to not provide a patch if customers have little 
option to change products or if all competitors behave 
alike. Arora et al. [31] analyze the timing of patch 
release and find that both the competition effect and 
disclosure threat effect hasten patch release, with 
competition having an even stronger effect. Cavusoglu 
et al. [32] apply game theory to compare liability and 
cost-sharing as mechanisms for incentivizing vendors 
to patch their software and conclude that liability helps 
where vendors release less often than optimal, while 
cost-sharing helps where they release more often. 
If the vulnerability is not published (and detected 
by “white hats” other than the vendor), again, the 
question arises of whether the vendor should provide a 
patch or not. While the aforementioned economic 
arguments still hold, the decision to not provide a patch 
might be additionally rooted in the assumptions that (a) 
a non-published vulnerability is hardly exposed to 
attacks, (b) any vulnerability disclosure reduces the 
vendor’s reputation, and (c) the patch reveals the 
vulnerability to attackers who then try to compile 
exploits and to use them to attack unpatched systems.        
When a vulnerability patch is available, the search 
for newly injected vulnerabilities starts since it is 
known that patches can contain new vulnerabilities 
[33]. As the injection refers to new vulnerability, 
Figure 1 shows a dashed line. 
The uncertainty of whether a vulnerability should 
be published and patched also applies to the decision of 
whether a software patch should be installed. The 
customers – be they private users or institutions – still 
have to determine the risk of installing the patch 
(immediately) for two reasons: First, the patch might 
contain even more critical vulnerabilities than the 
patched ones. Second, the benefit from having one or 
several vulnerabilities removed needs to be opposed to 
the risk that the patch installation makes applications 
dysfunctional, which can lead to considerable 
economic harm (for example, when production systems 
discontinue working or online shops are shut down.)  
The previous discussion of the lifecycle stresses 
that the empirical security of software goes beyond 
technological phenomena and also depends on 
economic conditions. In the particular context of open 
source and closed source software, Anderson [34] 
draws on software reliability models and statistical 
thermodynamics to show that although, under ideal 
conditions, open and closed systems are equally secure, 
this symmetry can be broken due to economic 
phenomena, such as transaction costs and the behavior 
of vendors. 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
3.1. Research framework 
 
The research framework used in this paper is 
shown in Figure 3. In order to answer the research 
questions whether (particular styles of) open source 
development or closed source development lead to less 
severe vulnerabilities and more effective patching 
behavior of vendors, we use vulnerability data of the 
NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and 
patch data included in several other data pools. More 
specifically, the analysis of data addresses the 
following research hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Open source development and closed source 
development do not differ in their impact on 
the severity of published vulnerabilities. 
 
H1b: Open source development and closed source 
development do not differ in their impact on 
the patching behavior of software vendors. 
 H2a: Bazaar style development and cathedral style 
development do not differ in their impact on 
the severity of published vulnerabilities. 
 
H2b: Bazaar style development and cathedral style 
development do not differ in their impact on 
the patching behavior of software vendors. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Research framework 
 
The following subsections describe the data 
acquisition procedures and explain which open source 
and closed source software were selected.  
 
3.2. Investigated software packages 
 
The selection of software packages was driven by 
the goal to have different groups of widely deployed 
(open source and closed source) software available, 
which contemporaneously show diversity in 
functionality across groups (comprehensiveness) and 
homogeneity in functionality inside the groups 
(comparability). Although it cannot be proved that the 
results of this empirical study also apply to other, less 
deployed packages, the results provide a 
comprehensive overview of software that is widely 
used in private and institutional environments and that 
is, thus, in the focus of attackers and defenders. 
Assuming that most software is usually attacked 
through the (client-server-based) Internet, we adopt the 
client-server perspective to frame the selection of 
software packages.  At the client side, the most widely 
deployed operating systems (OS) are Microsoft OS, 
MAC OSX and Linux derivations. Among the 
Microsoft OP, Windows 2000, Windows XP and 
Windows Vista are the leading ones in terms of market 
share, but we exclude the latter due to its short history 
(release date: January 30, 2007). Regarding Linux, we 
(arbitrarily) selected Red Hat Linux and Debian Linux, 
which are widely deployed Linux distributions. In 
addition to operating systems, we analyze web 
browsers, email clients and office software, which are 
widely used in both private and commercial 
environments. Regarding web browsers, Internet 
Explorer and Firefox are the most widely used 
programs, regarding email clients and office software, 
we select Outlook Express and Thunderbird, which are 
comparable in terms of functionality in contrast to 
Outlook, which integrates much more functionality, 
and MS Office and OpenOffice. 
On the server site, we analyze web servers and 
(relational) database management systems (DBMS), 
which are widely used application types. Internet 
Information Services and Apache are the most 
frequently used web servers. Oracle and DB2 are two 
of the mostly used closed source DBMS, while as open 
source DBMS DB2 and PostgreSQL are frequently 
used. The specific versions of the software packages 
are given in Table 2. 
 
3.3. Vulnerability data  
 
The MITRE CVE group provides both a definition 
of vulnerabilities (see discussion above), and a 
dictionary of vulnerabilities [22]. This dictionary 
contains for each vulnerability a standard identifier 
number (e.g. CVE-1999-0067), a brief description, and 
references to related vulnerability reports and 
advisories. As the data sources of CVE are manifold 
and include trustful organizations, such as US-CERT 
and SecurityFocus, the CVE input can be assumed to 
be comprehensive, although it cannot be guaranteed 
that all disclosed vulnerabilities are considered. The 
analysis of potential vulnerabilities by the MITRE 
content team assures that each CVE candidate has been 
inspected by security professionals. Overall, the CVE 
dictionary is a valuable resource for vulnerability 
analysis in terms of both quantity and quality. The 
CVE group recommends to use the NIST National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) (http://nvd.nist.gov/), 
which is the only data pool that provides full database 
functionality for the complete MITRE CVE dictionary. 
The NVD, formerly known as ICAT, contains 
information on all CVE identifiers. The NVD is 
updated immediately whenever a new vulnerability is 
added to the CVE dictionary of vulnerabilities. New 
vulnerabilities are then analyzed by NVD analysts on a 
first-in, first-out basis and augmented with attributes 
(see below) usually within two U.S. government 
business days [35]. The NVD team then adds 
additional information, some of which is as follows 
[36]: 
• Affected software and versions: The NVD applies 
the structured naming scheme CPE (Common 
Platform Enumeration) provided by MITRE. An 
example is “cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:3”. 
• (Base) Score: The NVD provides vulnerability 
scores for almost all published vulnerabilities 
using the “Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System” (CVSS) 2.0 (http://www.first.org/ 
cvss/cvss-guide.html). The scores are between 0 
and 10 (highest severity) and the particular value 
depends on several characteristics of the 
vulnerability, such as the level of authentication 
needed to exploit the vulnerability and the impact 
of a security breach on confidentiality and 
integrity. CVSS scores for vulnerabilities 
published prior to 11/9/2005 were approximated 
by the NVD team from prior CVSS metric data.  
The investigation of the NVD conversion script 
reveals that for all CVSS 2 characteristics 
corresponding CVSS 1 ones are available [35] and 
a “natural” conversion was conducted, which 
allows comparing scores converted into CVSS 2 
with “new” CVSS 2 scores. 
• Original release date (ORD): The ORD assigned 
to a CVE identifier does not necessarily mirror the 
actual date of disclosure due to two potential time 
gaps: 1) Time between the actual disclosure of a 
vulnerability (on the web or in mailing lists, for 
example) and its consideration in the “Assigned” 
phase of the MITRE CVE workflow. (2) Time 
between the “Assigned” date and the NVD 
publication date. This gap is usually not larger 
than some days [35], but as information on time 
gap (1) is available, the computation of patch 
times and exploit times would contain errors of 
unknown size.  
 
The following analysis of NVD vulnerabilities is based 
on NVD xml data feeds as available at 31 January 
2009. All feeds were imported into MS Office Excel 
2007 and processed using filters and MS Query. In 
order to assure that vulnerabilities listed in the NVD 
data feeds have not been accidentally misattributed 
regarding the affected software version, we double-
check the affected software versions of each 
vulnerability on the websites of vendors, MITRE, and 
SecurityFocus. In the very few cases of inconsistencies 
we exclude the particular vulnerability from any 
further analysis. This procedure was extremely time-
consuming, but useful to assure the correctness of 
NVD information on affected software versions. 
 
 
3.4. Patch data 
 
While the analysis of vulnerabilities and their 
publication refers to the first three phases of the 
software vulnerability lifecycle and thereby mirrors 
software communities’ behavior in terms of creating, 
detecting, and publishing vulnerabilities, the 
investigation of the provision of patches aims at 
identifying communities’ behavior regarding actively 
addressing and finally removing vulnerability issues. In 
order to detect differences in the patching behavior of 
open source and closed source vendors, we analyze 
how many of the vulnerabilities remained unpatched 
and whether any correlation between the patch status 
and the severity of vulnerabilities exists. Although 
vendor sites provide patch dates, we do not analyze the 
time gap between vulnerability disclosure and vendor’s 
provision of patches, as the vulnerability publication 
dates contained in the NVD do not necessarily give the 
actual publication date (cmp. discussion above). In 
contrast to vulnerability publication data, reliable data 
on patches can be (manually) collected by directly 
looking up vendors’ sites and vendor-neutral websites. 
More specifically, we use the following data sources to 
obtain reliable patch data: NVD, MITRE site, US-
CERT Vulnerability Notes Database, SecurityFocus, 
Microsoft Security Bulletins, OpenOffice.org, The 
Open Source Vulnerability Database, The X-Force 
database (IBM), Mozilla Foundation Security 
Advisories, Red Hat Network, Apache Security 
Reports, Apple Mailing Lists, IBM FixPaks, VUPEN 
Security, mySQL Forge, and Oracle Security Alerts 
and Patch Updates. The newly compiled data pool 
contains patch data on the aforementioned browsers, 
email clients, web servers, office products, operating 
systems and database management systems. 
 
4. Empirical results  
 
4.1. Severity of vulnerabilities 
 
We analyze the severity of vulnerabilities for each 
software package in terms of mean, median, standard 
deviation, and the proportion of highly severe 
vulnerabilities. For each application type, the median 
of medians is also given (see Table 2). The analysis 
provides the following results:  
• The medians of medians reveal that the 
vulnerabilities of office products are much more 
severe (8.45) than those of web servers (5.0), 
while the values of the other application types are 
close to each other. 
• When we determine the medians of medians of 
open source software (5.7) and closed source 
software (6.8) and also the corresponding medians 
of the proportions of highly severe vulnerabilities 
(30.28% and 45.95%, respectively), the first 
impression is that open source software is more 
secure in terms of the severity level. However, 
applying statistical analysis (Mann-Whitney U-
test), no statistically significant differences can be 
found: the two-tailed test provides a high number 
for p (p=0.1139). Applying the same test to the 
proportion figures, the test, again, does not 
indicate that the samples are significantly different 
at the 0.05 level (p=0.06). To sum up, we find no 
statistically significant difference between the 
severity of vulnerabilities in open source and 
closed source software. Thus, we have no 
statistically significant evidence that hypothesis 1a 
is wrong. 
• Comparing open source software developed in 
bazaar style with that developed in cathedral style, 
no significant difference in terms of median 
(p=0.25) and also no significant difference in 
terms of the proportion of highly severe 
vulnerabilities occur (p=0.39). Consequently, we 
get no statistically significant evidence that 
hypothesis 2a is wrong. 
 
Table 2. Severity of published vulnerabilities 
Application 
type 
Product Devel. Type
1)
 Severity 
(range=[0;10]) 
  
 
mean median std. 
dev. 
Proportion of 
highly severe 
vulnerabilities  
([7;10])
2)
 
Median of 
medians 
Browser Internet 
Explorer 7 
Closed 
6.65 6.80 2.07 45.95% 
 6.6 
Firefox 2 Open (BS) 6.38 6.40 2.11 36.53% 
Email 
client 
MS Outlook 
Express 6 
Closed 
6.18 
 
5.10 1.76 
 
39.13% 
 5.95 
Thunderbird 1 Open (CS) 6.53 6.80 2.23 47.27% 
Web 
server 
IIS 5 Closed 6.00 5.00 1.55 36.14% 
5.00 
Apache2 Open (CS) 5.36 5.00 1.50 18.75% 
Office MS Office 
2003 
Closed 
8.11 9.30 1.91 67.72% 
8.45 
OpenOffice 2 Open (CS) 7.61 7.60 1.79 63.16% 
Operating 
system 
Windows 2000 Closed 6.58 7.20 2.10 57.92% 
6.8 
Windows XP Closed 6.67 7.20 2.16 58.92% 
MAC OSX Closed 
4) 
6.18 6.80 2.13 41.33% 
Red Hat 
Enterprise 
Linux 4
3)
 
Open (CS) 4.72 4.90 2.20 23.11% 
Debian 3.1
3)
 Open (BS) 4.75 4.90 2.21 23.19% 
Database 
Management 
Systems 
mySQL 5 Open (BS) 5.05 4.90 2.02 12.12% 
5.7 
PostgreSQL 8 Open (CS) 6.17 6.80 1.89 36.00% 
Oracle 10g Closed 5.96 5.50 2.05 33.33% 
DB2 v8 Closed 6.22 7.2 2.75 53.85% 
BS: Bazaar style CS: Cathedral style 
1) Regarding the identification of the particular open source development style (cathedral vs. bazaar) we checked the particular 
community websites. In some cases we found elements of both styles. The binary classification in the table reflects the 
author’s assessment according to whether they are more “cathedral style” or “bazaar style”. 
2) compliant with CVSS severity ratings 
3) The NVD lists linux kernel vulnerabilities separately from vulnerabilities of specific Linux distributions.  Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux 4 uses Linux kernel 2.6.9, Debian 3.1 uses Linux kernels 2.4.27 or 2.6.8. We consider only those kernel 
vulnerabilities that were published after the release date of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 and Debian 3.1, respectively.  
4) Some open source components are included. 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Patching behavior 
 
Table 3 shows aggregated patch data for each 
software package. Vulnerabilities for which we could 
not find any patch information by February 28, 2009 
are classified as “still unpatched”. It is remarkable to 
see that 17.6% (30.4%) of the published open (closed) 
source software vulnerabilities (in terms of the median) 
are still unpatched. However, applying statistical 
analysis (Mann-Whitney U-test) on the proportions of 
unpatched vulnerabilities, no statistically significant 
differences between open and closed source software 
can be found: the two-tailed test provides a high 
number for p (p=0.48). Regarding open source 
software developed in bazaar or in cathedral style (see 
Table 2), again, no statistically significant difference 
appears (p=0.79).  Apparently, the proportion of still 
unpatched vulnerabilities largely depends on the 
specific vendor. We discuss this behavior in detail 
below. 
Interestingly, the case of Microsoft also shows that 
even the same vendor can apply different patching 
behavior dependent on the particular application type: 
while only 4% of MS Office 2003 vulnerabilities 
remain unpatched, one out of three vulnerabilities of 
both operating systems remain unpatched, every 
second vulnerability of IIS is still open, and even two 
out of three vulnerabilities of the Internet clients 
remain unpatched. The case of operating systems 
shows that the proportion of unpatched vulnerabilities 
of software cannot be explained by simply considering 
the number of vulnerabilities, it rather depends on the 
vendors’ patching priorities.   
 
 
Table 3. Patched and unpatched vulnerabilities 
Application 
type 
Product 
Vulnerabilities (un)patched Median of severities 
#vuln. #vuln. 
unpatched 
Prop. of un-
patched vuln. 
unpatched patched overall 
Browser 
Internet 
Explorer 7 
74 49 66.22% 5.0 9.3 6.8 
Firefox 2 167 34 20.36% 5.0 6.8 6.4 
Email client 
MS Outlook 
Express 6 
23 15 65.22% 5.0 7.3 5.1 
Thunderbird 
1 
110 6   5.45% 3.45 6.95 6.8 
Web server 
IIS 5 83 40 48.19% 5.0 7.2 5.0 
Apache2 80 21 26.25% 4.7 5.0 5.0 
Office 
MS Office 
2003 
99 4   4.04% 5.05 9.3 9.3 
OpenOffice 2 19 4 21.05% 5.25 9.3 7.6 
Operating 
system 
Windows 
2000 
385 117 30.39% 
 
5.1 7.2 7.2 
Windows XP 297 91 30.64% 5.0 7.5 7.2 
MAC OSX 300 20    6.67% 5.0 6.8 6.8 
Red Hat 
Enterprise 
Linux 4 
264 39 14.77% 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Debian 3.1 207 30 14.49% 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Database 
Management 
System 
mySQL 5 33 8 24.24% 4.6 4.9 4.9 
PostgreSQL 8 25 3 12.00% 9.0 6.3 6.8 
Oracle 10g 63 8 12.70% 7.35 5.5 5.5 
DB2 v8 13 1  7.69% 7.8 7.2 7.2 
 
 
It is interesting to compare the severity median of 
unpatched vulnerabilities with the median of patched 
vulnerabilities, in order to detect vendors’ patching 
priorities and differences between open source and 
closed source software. The data in Table 3 reveal that, 
for all six Microsoft products, there is a strong bias 
towards patching the most severe vulnerabilities. This 
result indicates that Microsoft decides to leave less 
severe vulnerabilities unpatched, probably because the 
economic efforts would not be compensated by the 
(minor) gain in software security. However, on the 
other hand the result also shows that Microsoft is 
interested in patching severe vulnerabilities, which 
reveals that software security is regarded a serious 
market issue. Apple (MAC OSX) shows a similar 
behavior in their operating system in terms of the 
severities of patched and unpatched vulnerabilities, 
but, in contrast to Microsoft, Apple seems to be 
interested in patching most of the vulnerabilities. We 
find this strong interest in patching vulnerabilities also 
in the cases of Oracle and IBM (DB2), but the severity 
medians of unpatched vulnerabilities are higher than 
those of the patched ones. To sum up, three out of four 
closed source software vendors leave few 
vulnerabilities unpatched and the other vendor focuses 
on patching more severe vulnerabilities. 
Regarding the medians of patched and unpatched 
vulnerabilities of open source vendors and their 
particular development style (bazaar vs. cathedral), we 
do not find any pattern. In addition, the patching 
behavior of open source vendors shows that the 
proportion of unpatched vulnerabilities varies between 
12% and 26.25% and can differ considerably. On the 
other hand, none of the eight open source software 
packages shows an outlier, in contrast to closed source 
software. Consequently, we hypothesize that open 
source software development at least prevents 
“extremely bad” patching behavior. 
As a result of the analysis of the patching behavior 
of software vendors, it turns out that the behavior is not 
determined by the particular software development 
style, but by the policy of the particular development 
community, i.e. there is no statistically significant 
evidence against hypotheses 1b and 2b. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions  
 
This work presented the first comprehensive 
empirical study on the security of open source and 
closed source security. It compared 17 well known and 
widely deployed software packages regarding the 
severity of published vulnerabilities and vendors’ 
patching behavior. The empirical results showed that 
open source and closed source software do not 
significantly differ in terms of the severity of 
vulnerabilities and vendors’ patching behavior. 
Although open source software development seems to 
prevent “extremely bad” patching behavior, overall 
there is no empirical evidence that the particular type 
of software development is the primary driver of 
security. Rather, the policy of the particular 
development community or vendor determines the 
patching behavior. To sum up, empirics suggest that 
we have essentially asked the wrong question by 
discussing whether open source or closed source 
software leads to more security. 
Consequently, in order to make software less 
vulnerable, it is most important to provide strong 
economic incentives for software producers to provide 
patches (at least for disclosed vulnerabilities) or, even 
better, to avoid vulnerabilities at the outset. 
Apparently, the question of how secure software 
packages are deserves increasing attention of 
economists.   
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